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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Governor Jim Rowland of Connecticut resigned in the 
midst of scandal.1  He was accused of accepting lavish gifts and 
political contributions from state government contractors in 
exchange for awarding government contracts.2  In response to this 
scandal, Connecticut passed one of the most comprehensive state 
ethics reform bills in recent years.3  Among other things, the new 
law flatly prohibits a wide range of individuals associated with state 
contractors from making political contributions to a wide range of 
state candidates.4
Connecticut’s law is just one recent example of legislation 
aimed at eliminating so-called “pay-to-play” between state 
contractors and state political candidates.  Several states have 
 1. See, e.g., The Week, NATIONAL REVIEW,  July 12, 2004 “After a prolonged 
corruption scandal, Connecticut governor John Rowland resigned rather than face 
certain impeachment by the legislature . . . .”); Fred Bayles, Scandal-plagued Conn. 
governor to resign, USA TODAY, June 22, 2004, at 3A; Amy Fagan, Governor resigns; 
Ethics Scandal Ousts Rowland of Connecticut, WASH. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A01; 
Connecticut Gov. Rowland Resigns; John G. Rowland Leaving Office Amid Gift-Taking 
Scandal, CBS NEWS.COM, June 21, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07 
/01/politics/main627067.html.  Rowland later pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to a prison term for taking bribes.  See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Connecticut Governor 
Gets 1 Year in Prison for Corruption, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at A03; Matt Apuzzo 
& John Christoffersen, Former Gov. Rowland Gets a Year in Prison for Graft, USA 
TODAY.COM, Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-03-18-
rowland_x.htm.  
 2. See generally sources cited supra note 1. 
 3. See An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform for 
State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn. Acts P.A. 05-
5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-601 to 9-674 (Supp. 2007)), 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/PA/2005PA-00005-R00SB-02103SS3 
-PA.htm. 
 4. See  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(F) (Supp. 2007). 
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enacted such laws.  This article begins by providing a high-level 
overview of the types of laws state legislatures have passed, focusing 
on six states with generally applicable pay-to-play laws:  
Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and 
West Virginia.5
The article then discusses the First Amendment issues raised 
by these state laws.  Although the right to make political 
contributions is not entitled to the same high-level scrutiny as other 
First Amendment rights, limits on contributions nevertheless must 
be “closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important state interest.”6  The 
Supreme Court has held that combating corruption, including 
quid pro quos, is a sufficient state interest.7  Nonetheless, some of 
the pay-to-play laws in force do not appear to be closely drawn to 
this interest.  Therefore, they impair the rights of those who seek to 
participate in the political process through political contributions. 
This article analyzes the laws of the six states surveyed and 
asserts that the laws of Connecticut and New Jersey may be 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  They prohibit contributions from 
individuals only marginally related to state contracts to recipients 
who may not be in a position to act on the award of a state 
contract.8  This article concludes that states passing pay-to-play laws 
should tailor the reach of such laws to focus on those contributors 
and recipients closely related to state contracts.  States also can 
build additional safeguards into pay-to-play legislation by requiring 
 5. This article does not discuss pay-to-play laws in many states that are 
focused on a particular industry.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-70.1, –70.2 
(LexisNexis 1999) (regulating contributions from public utilities regulated by the 
Public Services Commission); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 19981–82 (Supp. 2007) 
(regulating contributions to the Gambling Control Commission); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 18, § 2304(6) (1999) (regulating contributions from insurance companies to 
the Insurance Commissioner); FLA. STAT. § 106.082 (2002) (regulating 
contributions from vendors who do business with the Commissioner of 
Agriculture); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(L) (Supp. 2007) (regulating 
contributions from persons associated with the gaming industry); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 409.107 (2001) (regulating contributions from an entity serving as financial 
underwriter, financial advisor, or investment advisor for a State Highway and 
Transportation Commission bond); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402:43 (2005) 
(regulating contributions from insurance companies); N.M. STAT. § 10-11-
130.1(B) (2003) (regulating contributions from contractors with the Public 
Employees Retirement Board). 
 6. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (2006) (plurality op.) (citing 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). 
 7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27 (1976).  See also infra Part IV.A. 
 8. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g) (Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-
20.15, –20.16 (Supp. 2007). 
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open and competitive bidding of state contracts or by prohibiting 
earmarked contributions. 
II. PAY-TO-PLAY LEGISLATION IN GENERAL 
The aim of state pay-to-play legislation is to eliminate political 
quid pro quos; i.e., state contractors giving political contributions 
to state candidates in exchange for favorable treatment in awarding 
state contracts.9  The states surveyed vary in how broadly they 
define “state contractor” (i.e., the contributor) and “state 
candidate” (i.e., the recipient).  States also take different 
approaches in determining the types of contracts that would make 
a state contractor subject to the law.  This section discusses the 
contributors, recipients, and contracts targeted by the laws of 
Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and 
West Virginia. 
A. Contributors Targeted 
State laws that apply to the narrowest category of contributors 
subject only the state contractor itself to pay-to-play laws and do not 
apply to natural persons (unless, of course, the state contractor is a 
natural person).  The laws of South Carolina and West Virginia are 
two examples.  For instance, South Carolina’s pay-to-play law 
extends to a “person who has been awarded a contract with the 
State, a county, a municipality, or a political subdivision thereof.”10  
This law appears, at least facially, to apply only to the actual entity 
entering into the state contract.  Thus, unless the state contractor 
 9. For instance, the New Jersey state legislature explained that it was 
prohibiting the award of government contracts to business entities that contribute 
to political candidates because of a “compelling interest” in “protecting the 
integrity of government contractual decisions and of improving the public’s 
confidence in government.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (Supp. 2007).  It 
explained: 
There exists the perception that campaign contributions are often made 
to a State or county political party committee by an individual or business 
seeking favor with State elected officials, with the understanding that the 
money given to such a committee will be transmitted to other committees 
in other parts of the State, or is otherwise intended to circumvent legal 
restrictions on the making of political contributions or gifts directly to 
elected State officials, thus again making elected State officials beholden 
to those contributors . . . . 
Id. 
 10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006). 
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happens to be a sole proprietorship, individual political 
contributions would not be involved.11
Most pay-to-play legislation, however, also encompasses 
contributions from other individuals closely associated with a state 
contractor.  For example, Connecticut’s law completely bans 
certain political contributions from “principals” of state contractors 
and prospective state contractors.12  The principals of a business 
entity include the following groups: (1) members of the board of 
directors;13 (2) owners of five percent or more of the business;14 (3) 
the president, treasurer, and executive vice president (or other 
chief executive officer);15 (4) employees who have “managerial or 
discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract;”16 (5) 
spouses and dependent children over eighteen-years old of any of 
the above;17 and (6) political committees (including political action 
committees, or “PACs”) “established or controlled” by any of the 
other or by the state contractor itself.18  The business entity itself is 
flatly barred from making a political contribution.19
In New Jersey, a business entity that contracts with the state 
may not make any reportable political contributions during the 
 11. West Virginia’s law facially extends only to the “person” who actually 
enters into a contract with the state.  See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006) 
(providing that “no person entering into any contract with the State” may make 
certain political contributions). 
 12. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)–(B) (Supp. 2007).  Although 
Connecticut’s law applies equally to state contractors and prospective state 
contractors, this article generally refers only to state contractors.  The term “state 
contractor” can include any “person, business entity or nonprofit organization that 
enters into a state contract.”  Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(D).  “Business entity” is defined 
in the statute to include, among other things, 
[s]tock corporations, banks, insurance companies, business associations, 
bankers associations, insurance associations, trade or professional 
associations which receive funds from membership dues and other 
sources, partnerships, joint ventures, private foundations . . . ; trusts or 
estates; [certain other] corporations . . . ; cooperatives, and any other 
association, organization or entity which is engaged in the operation of a 
business or profit-making activity. 
Id. § 9-601(8). 
 13. Id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The statute explains that “managerial or discretionary responsibilities” 
means that the person has “substantive responsibilities with respect to the 
negotiation of the state contract.”  Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(H). 
 17. Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(F). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. § 9-613. 
5
Reed: Regulating Political Contributions by State Contractors: The Firs
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
REED - ADC 2/3/2008  2:43:37 PM 
640 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
term of the contract.20  “Business entity” is defined in the statute to 
include not only to the state contractor itself, but also (1) any 
principal who owns or controls more than ten percent of the 
profits, assets, or stock of the company; (2) any indirect or direct 
subsidiary of the company; (3) any PAC directly or indirectly 
controlled by any of the above; and (4) if the state contractor is a 
natural person, the individual’s cohabitating spouse or child.21  A 
similar ban applies to a business entity that contracts with a county 
or municipal government.22
Ohio’s law is less burdensome than Connecticut’s or New 
Jersey’s, although it still applies to a large group of contributors.  It 
does not flatly prohibit political contributions from state 
contractors.23  Instead it imposes aggregate limits on the political 
 20. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-20.15, –20.16 (Supp. 2007) (defining 
“contribution” to include only reportable contributions).  A contribution is 
reportable if it is more than $300.  See id. § 19:44A-8(d).  “[A]ny natural or legal 
person, business corporation, professional services corporation, limited liability 
company, partnership, limited partnership, business trust, association or any other 
legal commercial entity organized under the laws of this State or of any other state 
or foreign jurisdiction” is considered a “business entity.”  Id. § 19:44A-20.17.  See 
also id. § 19:44A-20.7 (same definition applied to county and municipal contracts). 
A business entity that seeks to obtain a state contract is also subject to certification 
and reporting requirements.  See id. § 19:44A-20.8 (requiring state legislative 
agencies, counties, and municipalities to obtain written certification from a 
business entity that it has not made a prohibited contract prior to the award of the 
contract and requiring the business entity to report any improper contribution it 
makes during the duration of the contract); § 19:44A-20.18 (requiring the state to 
require a report of a business entity’s political contributions for the previous four 
years prior to the award of a state contract); § 19:44A-20.19 (requiring the state to 
obtain a written certification from a business entity that it has not made a 
prohibited contribution prior to the award of a contract and requiring the 
business entity to report any improper contribution it makes during the duration 
of the contract); § 19:44A-20.26(a) (requiring a state, county, or municipality to 
obtain a list of political contributions made during the preceding twelve-month 
period within ten days of entering into certain state contracts).  Every contract and 
bid application must contain a provision indicating that compliance with the pay-
to-play law is a material term.  See id. § 19:44A-20.24. 
 21. See id. § 19:44A-20.17. 
 22. See id. § 19:44A-20.4 (regarding county contracts); § 19:44A-20.5 
(regarding municipal contracts).  The only difference is that the provisions 
regarding county and municipal government specifically exempt contracts entered 
into through a “fair and open process.”  Id.  See also id. § 19:44A-20.6 (providing for 
application to an entity having an interest in the business entity and the spouse or 
child of the business entity, when the entity is a natural person); § 19:44A-20.7 
(defining “business entity,” “interest,” and “fair and open process”). 
 23. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)(3) (Supp. 2007) (regarding 
unincorporated state contractors); § 3517.13(J)(3) (regarding incorporated state 
contractors). 
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contributions of certain individuals associated with state 
contractors.24  For incorporated state contractors, the contribution 
limits apply to owners of more than twenty percent of the 
corporation, as well as their spouses and children between ages 
seven and seventeen.25  Such persons may not make political 
contributions totaling more than $1000 from the date of the 
contract through one year following the conclusion of the 
contract.26  In addition, these owners, spouses, and children, along 
with any political action committee (“PAC”) affiliated with the state 
contractor, are subject to a combined aggregate limit of $2000 
during this time period.27
Kentucky’s law is the most lenient of those surveyed.  It 
subjects state contractors, and those associated with state 
contractors, to the same contribution limits as other individuals and 
entities.28  But if a state contractor, or a person who has a 
substantial interest in a state contractor, contributes more to a 
candidate for governor or lieutenant governor than is allowed by 
law, the state contractor may not enter into a contract during the 
term of office following the campaign, unless the contract has been 
obtained through competitive bidding.29  A natural person has a 
“substantial interest” in a state contractor if the person, together 
with his or her immediate family members, owns or controls ten 
percent or more of the state contractor.30
 24. Any state contractor must certify in the contract that it and the individuals 
associated with it are in compliance with the political contribution limits.  See id. 
§ 3517.13(I)(3) (regarding unincorporated state contractors); § 3517.13(J)(3) 
(regarding incorporated state contractors). 
 25. See id. § 3517.13(J)(2)(a).  The law only takes into account owners for the 
entire period of the contract.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. § 3517.13(J)(2)(b).  For unincorporated state contractors, the 
$1,000 individual limit applies to an individual, partner or owner, shareholder (of 
an association), an executor of an estate, or a trustee, as well as to spouses and 
children between ages seven and seventeen-years old.  See id. § 3517.13(I)(2)(a).  
The $2,000 combined aggregate limit also encompasses an affiliated PAC.  See id. 
§ 3517.13(I)(2)(b). 
 28. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (Supp. 2007) (citing contribution 
limits in section 121.150). 
 29. See id. § 121.056(2). 
 30. See id. at subdiv. (2)(a). 
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B. Recipients Targeted 
1. State Officials 
States with pay-to-play laws that apply to the narrowest class of 
recipients prohibit contributions only to the public official actually 
in a position to determine the award of the state contract.  South 
Carolina’s narrowly tailored pay-to-play law, for instance, prohibits 
a person who has been awarded a state contract from contributing 
to the public official who “was in a position to act on the contract’s 
award.”31  Similarly, Ohio’s law addresses only contributions “to the 
holder of the public office having ultimate responsibility for the 
award of the contract or to the public officer’s campaign 
committee.”32  Kentucky’s law addresses only contributions to 
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor.33
West Virginia’s law affects the broadest range of candidates.  
That state’s law restricts state contractors from making any political 
contribution to any candidate for public office or, in fact, “to any 
person for political purposes or use.”34
Other state pay-to-play provisions fall somewhere in the middle 
of these two extremes.  New Jersey bases its restrictions on whether 
the contract is with a municipal, county, or state government.  
Municipal contractors may not contribute to municipal elected 
officials or municipal political parties.35  County contractors may 
not contribute to county elected officials or county political 
 31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006).  The provision also prohibits a 
state contractor from investing “in a financial venture in which [the] public 
official has an interest.”  Id.  See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (Supp. 2007) 
(applying only to contributions to candidates for governor and lieutenant 
governor). 
 32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)(1) (Supp. 2007); § 3517.13(J)(1) 
(Supp. 2007). 
 33. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056 (Supp. 2007). 
 34. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006) (prohibiting a state contractor from 
making “any contribution to any political party, committee or candidate for public 
office or to any person for political purposes or use.”).  Note, however, that West 
Virginia’s restrictions on contributors covered are not so broad.  Facially, West 
Virginia’s law appears to only prohibit contributions from the state contractor 
itself.  Cf. id. § 3-8-8(b) (allowing a corporation to communicate with its 
stockholders and executive on any subject—including, presumably to encourage 
individual political contributions—and to administer a separate segregated fund 
that can contribute to candidates); § 3-8-12(d) (specifically exempting activities 
that are permissible under § 3-8-8 from the pay-to-play provision). 
 35. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.5 (Supp. 2007). 
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parties.36  State contractors may not contribute to gubernatorial 
candidates.37
Connecticut bases its restrictions on the branch of government 
involved in the contract.38  If the contract involves the executive 
branch, the law prohibits the state contractor from making political 
contributions to the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney 
general, state comptroller, secretary of state, or state treasurer (or 
to any of their committees).39  On the other hand, if the contract 
involved involves the state legislature, the law prohibits the state 
contractor from making political contributions to candidates for 
state senator or state representative (or either of their 
committees).40  One exception applies to certain prospective state 
contractors; if a prospective state contractor holds a valid 
prequalification certificate issued by the Commissioner of 
Administrative Services, it may not contribute to either executive or 
legislative candidates or committees.41
2. Political Parties 
Three states surveyed target so-called “back door” 
contributions by barring political contributions from state 
contractors (and associated individuals) to political party 
committees, as well as to individual candidates.  For instance, 
individuals subject to West Virginia’s pay-to-play law are prohibited 
from making any political contribution to a political party located 
in the state.42  New Jersey’s and Connecticut’s laws contain similar 
bans.43  The pay-to-play laws of Kentucky, Ohio, and South Carolina 
do not limit contributions to political parties. 
 36. See id. § 19:44A-20.4. 
 37. See id. § 19:44A-20.15. 
 38. Connecticut’s pay-to-play statute does not facially apply to contracts with 
local governmental units; it defines “state contract” to include agreements and 
contracts “with the state or any state agency or any quasi-public agency.”  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(C) (Supp. 2007). 
 39. Id. § 9-612(g)(2)(A). 
 40. See id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(B).  Principals of state contractors and prospective 
state contractors may still establish exploratory or candidate committees for their 
own campaigns.  Id. at subdiv. (g)(4). 
 41. Id. at subdivs. (g)(2)(A)–(B). 
 42. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006) (prohibiting a person entering into a 
state contract from making any direct or indirect contribution to any political 
party). 
 43. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)–(B) (prohibiting contributions 
from a state contractor to a party committee, regardless of whether the contract 
9
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C. Types of Contracts Targeted 
1. Competitive versus Non-competitive Bidding 
Three of the states’ pay-to-play laws—those of Kentucky, New 
Jersey, and South Carolina—provide an exception (at least in part) 
for state contractors involved in contracts not awarded through an 
open, competitive bidding process.44  For example, the part of New 
Jersey’s law dealing with county and municipal contracts exempts 
those awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process.”45  “Fair and 
open process” is defined to mean that the contract is publicly 
advertised, proposals are publicly solicited, the contract is awarded 
under publicly available criteria, and the contract is publicly 
announced when awarded.46  Despite these requirements for 
county and municipal contracts, however, the provisions of New 
Jersey law regarding state contracts apply regardless of whether the 
contract is awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process.”47
2. Monetary Thresholds 
Three states—Connecticut, New Jersey, and Ohio—regulate 
contributions only when an entity’s state contracts reach certain 
monetary thresholds.  Connecticut’s law applies only to 
relationships resulting from a single state contract with a value of 
$50,000 or more or a series of contracts with a value of $100,000 or 
involves the executive or legislative branches of government); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting contributions from a county contractor to a 
county committee of a political party “if a member of that political party is serving 
in an elective public office of that county when the contract is awarded”); § 
19:44A-20.5 (prohibiting contributions from a municipal contractor to a 
municipal committee of a political party “if a member of that political party is 
serving in an elective public office of that municipality when the contract is 
awarded”); § 19:44A-20.15 (prohibiting contributions from a state contractor to 
“any State or county political party committee prior to the completion of the 
contract or agreement.”). 
 44. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2007). 
 45. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (regarding contracts with 
county governments and municipal governments). 
 46. Id. § 19:44A-20.7. 
 47. See id. § 19:44A-20.14 (discussing contracts with state governments, but 
not including any language limiting the provision’s application to contracts not 
awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process”).  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3517.13 (I)–(J) (Supp. 2007) (not containing any language limiting application 
to competitively bid contracts). 
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more in a fiscal year.48  New Jersey’s provisions generally apply only 
to contracts above $17,500.49  Ohio’s provisions apply to contracts 
valued at more than $500.50
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed, in a plurality 
opinion, that limits on the rights of individuals to make political 
contributions “‘implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,’ 
namely, the freedoms of ‘political expression’ and ‘political 
association.’”51  By making a political contribution, an individual is 
able to “express[] . . . support” for a candidate and the candidate’s 
views, as well as to “affiliate . . . with a candidate.”52
Because contribution limits “involve[] little direct restraint” on 
communication, the Supreme Court has subjected contribution 
limits to a lower standard of scrutiny than expenditure limits, which 
are thought to directly affect an individual’s ability to engage in 
communication.53  Nonetheless, contribution limits are still subject 
to some intermediate level of “exacting scrutiny.”54  In Randall v. 
Sorrell, the Supreme Court’s most recent case dealing with 
 48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(C)–(D) (Supp. 2007) (defining “state 
contractor” and “prospective state contractor” to apply to such relationships).  The 
state contract must involve (1) the rendition of personal services; (2) the 
furnishing of material, supplies, or equipment; (3) the construction, alteration, or 
repair of any public building or public work; (4) the acquisition, sale, or lease of 
any land or building; (5) a licensing agreement; or (6) a grant, loan, or loan 
guarantee.  Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(C). 
 49. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (dealing with contracts 
with county governments); § 19:44A-20.5 (dealing with contracts with municipal 
governments); § 19:44A-20.14 (dealing with contracts with the state government). 
 50. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)–(J) (Supp. 2007). 
 51. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976)). 
 52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 22. 
 53. Id. at 21.  The Buckley Court explained, “A contribution serves as a general 
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate 
the underlying basis for the support.”  Id.  The Court explained that the size of an 
individual’s contribution did little more than “provide[] a very rough index of the 
intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate.”  Id.  Nonetheless, the 
individual could still freely “discuss candidates and issues.”  Id.  See also Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996) (“The 
provisions that the Court found constitutional [in prior campaign finance cases] 
mostly imposed contribution limits.”); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 259–60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions 
require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.”). 
 54. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000). 
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contribution limits, the Court invalidated a Vermont statute that 
imposed what it viewed as overly restrictive contribution limits.55  
Justice Breyer, joined in his plurality opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito, explained that “[contribution] limits 
might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment 
interests than their anticorruption objectives could justify.”56  
Therefore, contribution limits were subject to “some lower 
bound.”57  Otherwise, “the constitutional risks to the democratic 
electoral process become too great.”58  Justice Breyer did not 
identify any specific level at which contribution limits could be too 
low, but he found that Vermont’s contribution limits contained 
“danger signs” because the limits were “sufficiently low as to 
generate suspicion that they [were] not closely drawn.”59
After pointing out that Vermont’s contribution limits were the 
lowest in the nation and well below limits previously upheld by the 
Court, Justice Breyer noted five specific problems with the low 
limits.  First, the statute’s limits were likely to “significantly restrict 
the amount of funding available for challengers,” particularly in 
hotly contested races.60  Second, the low limits also applied to 
political parties, which would have made it difficult for political 
parties to engage in coordinated activities and “threaten[ed] harm 
to . . . the right to associate in a political party.”61  Third, the low 
limits applied to expenses incurred by political volunteers, which 
would impede the ability of individuals to associate with political 
campaigns.62  Fourth, the low limits were not adjusted for 
 55. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500.  Under the Vermont law, Act 64, each 
individual, political committee, or political party was limited to contributing a total 
of $200 to $400 to each candidate for each two-year general election cycle.  Id. at 
2486.  These limits were not indexed for inflation.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 2491–92 (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395–97; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
 57. Id. at 2492. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2492–93. 
 60. Id. at 2494–95. 
 61. Id. at 2496; see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 
(2000); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357 (1997); Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996); Norman v. 
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1976) 
(explaining that contribution limits are “only a marginal restriction” on First 
Amendment rights, since a contributor can still associate in other ways). 
 62. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498.  Act 64 excluded volunteer activities from its 
definition of “contribution.”  Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(2) (2002)).  
However, Act 64 did not exclude expenses incurred while performing those 
volunteer activities.  See id. 
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inflation.63  Finally, Vermont had failed to put forth any “special 
justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so 
restrictive as to bring about the serious associational and expressive 
problems that we have described.”64  Accordingly, Justice Breyer 
concluded that the statute’s contribution limits were not “narrowly 
tailored.”65  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in 
the holding on the grounds that contribution limits are subject to 
strict scrutiny and Vermont’s limits did not pass this test.66  Justice 
Kennedy concurred and agreed with the “exacting scrutiny” 
employed by the plurality.67
After Randall, it appears that six justices—a majority of the 
current Court—would apply some heightened level of review to 
contribution limits.68  At a minimum, contribution limits must be 
justified by some “sufficiently important interest” and “closely 
drawn” to match that interest.69
IV. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES TO STATE PAY-
TO-PLAY LEGISLATION 
Under the principles cited above, state legislation limiting 
political contributions can only survive constitutional review if it is 
closely tailored to a substantial state interest.70  State pay-to-play 
legislation is aimed at what is almost certainly an adequate state 
interest in preventing corruption.71  But some state legislation may 
not be closely tailored to this interest. 
 63. Id. at 2499. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67. See id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 68. See Rachel Gage, Note, Randall v. Sorrell: Campaign Finance Regulation and 
the First Amendment as a Facilitator of Democracy, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 341, 359–68 
(2007) (discussing the attitudes of each of the justices towards a heightened level 
of review for political contributions). 
 69. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (“[U]nder Buckley’s standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit 
involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights could survive if the 
Government demonstrated that contribution regulation was ‘closely drawn’ to 
match a ‘sufficiently important interest,’ though the dollar amount of the limit 
need not be ‘fine tuned.’”). 
 70. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 71. See id. 
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A. Preventing Corruption and Quid Pro Quos is Clearly a Substantial         
  State Interest 
The Supreme Court has made clear that state governments 
have an interest in preventing potential state contractors from 
buying access to the market by making political contributions to 
those who are in a position to decide who will receive a state 
contract.72  “[T]he prevention of corruption and the appearance of 
corruption” is a “constitutionally sufficient justification” for 
imposing contribution limits.73  This corruption interest includes an 
interest in preventing actual or perceived quid pro quos.74
Additionally, quid pro quo arrangements are not the only 
opportunities for “improper influence” of the election process.75  
Improper influence can also result from “the broader threat from 
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”76  
 72. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007) (“This 
Court has long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.”) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 496–497 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC] (“We held in Buckley and 
reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government 
interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”); First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (“The importance of the 
governmental interest in preventing [corruption] has never been doubted.”).  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s holdings in this regard are certainly open to 
criticism.  See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption & 
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 119 (2004) (arguing that “trends in public perception of corruption may 
have little to do with the campaign finance system”); Bradley A. Smith, Money 
Talks:  Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 63 (1997) 
(arguing that reformers have “overstated the governmental interest in the 
anticorruption rationale” and “anything beyond disclosure” cannot be narrowly 
tailored to this interest). 
 73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 26. 
 74. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid 
pro quo: dollars for political favors.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27 (“To the extent 
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined.”); see also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 943 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (“In every case where a quid in the electoral process is being exchanged for 
a quo in a particular market where the government deals, the corruption in the 
market is simply the flipside of the electoral corruption.”). 
 75. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28). 
 76. Id.; see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (“Corruption is a subversion of the 
political process.  Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their 
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of 
money into their campaigns.”). 
14
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Thus, a legislative body may “constitutionally address the power of 
money ‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and 
specific’ than bribery.”77  In particular, a “perception of corruption 
[is] ‘inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions’ to candidates for public office” and is “a source of 
concern ‘almost equal’ to quid pro quo improbity.”78
Connecticut’s law, for example, is clearly intended to address 
the above state interests.  A federal district court assessing the law 
(but not on constitutional grounds) explained: 
The statute seeks to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of state government and to eliminate corruption 
and undue influence flowing from campaign 
contributions given or solicited by certain special 
interests.  The law also seeks to eliminate the appearance 
of corruption flowing from such contributions and to 
promote transparency in campaign financing and state 
contracting.79
Nonetheless, the fact that state pay-to-play laws may be 
intended to combat legitimate state interests does not mean that 
the means used to achieve these legitimate ends are appropriate. 
B. Some State Pay-to-Play Laws May Not be Closely Tailored 
The real issue with state pay-to-play legislation is whether such 
legislation is closely tailored to a state’s interest in preventing state 
contractors from using political contributions to “buy” state 
contracts.  The pay-to-play laws of the six states surveyed in this 
article generally fall into four categories: (1) laws that do not 
actually restrict political contributions, (2) laws that restrict 
contributions only from the state contractor itself to the public 
official in a position to award the contract, (3) laws that restrict 
 77. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28); see also United 
States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) (“Democracy is 
effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound 
to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which 
arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”). 
 78. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27); see also McConnell 
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as 
classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues 
not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the 
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the 
officeholder.”). 
 79. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D. 
Conn. 2007). 
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contributions from a broad class of contributors, but only to the 
public official in a position to award the contract, (4) laws that 
restrict contributions only from the state contractor itself, but to a 
broad class of state officials or to political parties, and (5) laws that 
restrict contributions from a broad class of contributors to a broad 
class of state officials or to political parties.  While state laws in 
categories (1) through (4) would most likely pass constitutional 
scrutiny, state laws in category (5) seem unconstitutionally 
overbroad. 
1. A Law that Does Not Actually Restrict Political Contributions 
Kentucky’s law applies to a broad class of contributors and 
recipients.  But this law is different from the other laws surveyed 
because the law does nothing to limit an individual’s ability to 
make political contributions equal to those made by other 
individuals not associated with a state contractor.  Rather, it merely 
imposes an additional penalty on state contractors when they (or 
their owners and immediate family members) make contributions 
exceeding the general limits: such state contractors may not obtain 
any state contract that has not been competitively bid.80  Thus, 
Kentucky’s law is not imposing any additional restrictions on the 
ability of individuals to participate in the political process by 
making political contributions.  This law appears constitutional. 
2. Laws Restricting Contributions Only From the State Contractor 
Itself to the Public Official in a Position to Award the Contract 
State law limiting contributions from an entity that hopes to 
contract with the state to the public official in a position to award a 
contract seems to be closely tailored, since it directly targets quid 
pro quos between the contributor and the recipient.  South 
Carolina’s law is an example, as it prohibits contributions only from 
the state contractor itself to the public official “in a position to act 
on the contract’s award.”81  On its face, this law only affects political 
contributions from one person (the state contractor itself) to 
another (the public official acting on the contract’s award).  In 
 80. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007). 
 81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006).  The provision also prohibits a 
state contractor from investing “in a financial venture in which [the] public 
official has an interest.”  Id.  See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis 
2004 & Supp. 2007) (applying only to contributions to candidates for governor 
and lieutenant governor). 
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fact, the only situation in which the law would affect an individual’s 
political contributions would be in the event that the state 
contractor was a sole proprietorship.82  “[A] showing of one 
affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed 
political advocacy that would be unconstitutional.”83  Thus, South 
Carolina’s law probably could pass constitutional scrutiny because it 
is closely tailored to the perceived problem South Carolina is 
seeking to avoid. 
3. Laws Restricting Contributions From a Broad Class of          
Contributors, but Only to the Public Official in a Position to 
Award the Contract 
Ohio’s law also applies to a broad group of potential 
contributors; however, it is limited in its application to recipients.  
For instance, for an incorporated state contractor, the act applies 
to contributions by any 20% owner, as well as that owner’s spouse, 
and any child between seven and seventeen years of age.84  But the 
only contributions barred are those to “the holder of the public 
office having ultimate responsibility for the award of that 
contract.”85  Furthermore, the context of the statute suggests that 
only one public official would ever have “ultimate responsibility” 
for the award of any particular state contract.86  Thus, the 
restriction on any individual’s general ability to make political 
contributions seems slight; in most cases, an individual would be 
prohibited from making a political contribution to only one state 
official.87  This law also seems to be closely tailored.88
 82. Cf. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that 
MSRB Rule G-37, regulating pay-to-play in the municipal securities business, is 
constitutional because it “constrains relations only between the two potential 
parties to a quid pro quo: the underwriters and their municipal finance employees 
on the one hand, and officials who might influence the award of negotiated 
municipal bond underwriting contracts on the other.”). 
 83. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000). 
 84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(J)(2)(a) (Supp. 2007). 
 85. Id. 
 86. For instance, the statute provides that when the “public officer who is 
responsible for the award of a contract is appointed by the governor . . . the office 
of the governor is considered to have ultimate responsibility for the award of the 
contract.” § 3517.13(K)(1).  See also § 3517.13(K)(2) (regarding appointees by the 
elected chief executive officer of a municipal corporation). 
 87. The prohibition could extend further if a particular state contractor 
entered into multiple contracts involving different public officials.  But in most 
instances, a state contractor with multiple contracts likely would be involved in 
repeated contracts with the same agency. 
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4. Laws Restricting Contributions Only From the State Contractor 
Itself, but to a Broad Class of State Officials or to Political Parties 
In terms of contributors and recipients affected, West Virginia 
has taken an approach almost directly opposite to Ohio.  West 
Virginia’s restriction facially applies to only one contributor: the 
state contractor itself.89  But the law bans contributions from the 
state contractor to any political party, committee, or candidate. 
Federal campaign finance law uses an approach similar to West 
Virginia’s; a U.S. government contractor is flatly banned from 
making any direct or indirect political contributions.90  But, a U.S. 
government contractor may still establish a PAC and employees of 
the contractor may make individual political contributions, so long 
as they are not indirect contributions from the contractor itself.91
West Virginia’s law, like the federal law, appears to be narrowly 
tailored.  The state law only restricts contributions from the state 
contractor itself.92  Therefore, unless the state contractor is a 
natural person, the law does not prohibit political contributions 
from individuals.  At the same time, the law applies to both indirect 
and direct contributions from the state contractor.93  Thus, the law 
addresses the problem of a state contractor using its employees as a 
“pass-through” for the contractor’s political contributions, while 
allowing employees of a state contractor to freely make political 
contributions that have not been directed by their employer. 
 88. The D.C. Circuit has deemed an analogous rule—Rule G-37 of the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board—to be constitutional.  See Blount v. SEC, 
61 F.3d 938, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  Rule G-37 prohibits municipal securities 
brokers and dealers, associated professionals, and PACs controlled by municipal 
securities brokers, dealers, and professionals, from contributing to the political 
campaigns of “an official of the issuer who can, directly or indirectly, influence the 
awarding of municipal securities business.”  Self Regulatory Organizations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33,868, 56 SEC Docket 1045 (Apr. 7, 1994).  “Municipal 
securities business” includes only business that is not competitively bid.  Id. 
 89. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006). 
 90. 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting any person who enters into a 
contract with the United States from directly or indirectly making “any 
contribution of money or other things of value” or promising “expressly or 
impliedly to make any such contribution to any political party, committee, or 
candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use . . . .”). 
 91. See id. at subdiv. (b) (allowing government contractors to establish 
separate segregated funds, but prohibiting “indirect” contributions from 
government contractors). 
 92. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000). 
 93. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006). 
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5. Laws Restricting Contributions From a Broad Class of 
Contributors to a Broad Class of State Officials or to Political 
Parties 
In each of the examples above, the state has enacted a law that 
affects contributions by state contractors, but has limited the 
application of the law either: (a) to those contributors who are 
most likely to make contributions in order to influence the award 
of a contract, (b) to those recipients who are most likely to be 
influenced by contributors to award a contract, or (c) to both 
groups.  New Jersey’s and Connecticut’s laws have a much broader 
application. 
a. Connecticut 
Connecticut’s law is broader than New Jersey’s law.  
Connecticut’s pay-to-play statute limits contributions not only from 
the employee who would actually administer a state contract, but 
from many other individuals who either have leadership 
responsibility or ownership interest in the business entity seeking to 
contract with the state.94  However, the law does not stop there.  It 
also applies to the spouse or dependent child (over eighteen-years 
old) of any of these individuals.95
Connecticut’s law prohibits all these individuals from making a 
wide range of political contributions.  If the contract involves the 
executive branch, these individuals are prohibited from 
contributing to any state-wide officer, as well as to any state political 
party.96  In addition, once an unacceptable political contribution 
has occurred, the state agency involved in the contract may void an 
existing contract and is prohibited from awarding any additional 
contract.97
Imagine the following scenario: ABC Corp. seeks to contract 
with the Connecticut Department of the Treasury.  X is a member 
 94. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(F) (Supp. 2007) (including an 
individual who is a member of the board of directors, an individual who is 
employed by a state contractor or senior vice president, an individual who is a 
chief executive officer, and an individual who has managerial or discretionary 
responsibilities with respect to a state contract). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(A) (prohibiting contributions to the governor, 
lieutenant governor, attorney general, state comptroller, secretary of state, or state 
treasurer). 
 97. Id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(C). 
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of ABC Corp.’s board of directors.  X’s spouse, Y, contributes to the 
candidate for state attorney general, not because Y has any 
intention of influencing the award of the state contract (Y may not 
even be aware that contract negotiations are occurring), but 
because Y supports the attorney general candidate’s views on drug 
control, consumer protection, or any number of issues entirely 
unrelated to the state contract.  Under Connecticut’s law, Y could 
unilaterally affect ABC Corp.’s ability to obtain a state contract. 
Connecticut’s law does contain an exception for “mitigating 
circumstances.”98  But it is unclear whether and how this exception 
would apply to this scenario, and it seems likely that in these 
circumstances the Department of the Treasury would simply 
choose another contractor if faced with a choice between ABC 
Corp. and another prospective state contractor with a clean bill of 
health.  Connecticut’s law also contains a clause allowing for the 
return of an improper contribution within thirty days.99  But within 
thirty days a contract might already be awarded.  More importantly, 
requiring Y to obtain a refund still affects Y’s ability to participate 
in the political process by contributing to Y’s candidate of choice. 
The prohibition on contributions to political parties 
exacerbates this problem.  By completely barring all political 
contributions from certain individuals associated with state 
contractors to political parties, Connecticut’s law hampers the 
ability of these individuals to associate with political parties.100  
Furthermore, the limitation is overbroad because these individuals, 
many of which may have no close connection to a state contract, 
could contribute to political parties for a variety of reasons other 
than as part of an effort to secure a state contract.101
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct 2479, 2496 (2006) (discussing the “important 
political right” of being able to “associate in a political party . . .”); see also Cal. 
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (“Representative democracy in 
any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to 
band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their 
political views.”); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357 
(1997) (“The First Amendment protects the right of citizens to associate and to 
form political parties for the advancement of common political goals and ideas.”); 
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (“[T]his Court has recognized the 
constitutional right of citizens to create and develop new political parties.”). 
 101. In a suit filed against the director of the Connecticut State Elections 
Enforcement Commission, the plaintiffs argued that Connecticut failed to show 
any connection between contributions by those the new law considers to be 
“principals” of state contractors and the award of state contracts.  See Plaintiffs’ 
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Certainly some individuals might contribute to a political party 
in response to a request by a particular official who is in a position 
to award a state contract, or might earmark contributions to a party 
for a particular state candidate in an effort to get around rules 
forbidding direct contributions to candidates.  But these problems 
can be solved in other ways.  For example, Connecticut could ban 
“indirect” contributions by state contractors to certain state 
officials, as West Virginia has done.102  Connecticut could also 
prohibit earmarked contributions or contributions made at the 
request of another. 
Furthermore, Connecticut’s law does not merely limit political 
contributions by the individuals affected; it outright bans all 
political contributions from these individuals to the relevant 
branch of government or to political parties.103  A federal district 
court has recently described the application of the law to spouses 
and children “as a prophylactic measure to prevent state 
contractors from circumventing the statute by using their 
immediate family as a conduit.”104  Nonetheless, there is a 
significant difference between limiting contributions from 
individuals associated with state contractors and prohibiting any 
contributions from these same individuals.105  Barring a minimal 
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 68–71, Green Party of Conn. v. 
Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D. Conn. July 13, 2007). 
 102. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006).  See also 2 U.S.C. § 441c (prohibiting 
direct and indirect contributions from federal government contractors). 
 103. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2) (Supp. 2007). 
 104. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts Ass’n v. Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38–39 (D. 
Conn. 2007) (discussing Kaplan v. Bd. of Educ., 759 F.2d 256, 261 (2d Cir. 1985)).  
See also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in relation to pay-to-play 
in the municipal securities field, explaining that “actors in this field are 
presumably shrewd enough to structure their relations rather indirectly . . .”).  The 
court in Garfield was dealing with the issue of whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction to the plaintiffs to prevent enforcement of a provision of the state’s pay-
to-play law requiring Internet disclosure of minor children of principals of state 
contractors.  See Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  The court granted the preliminary 
injunction on the basis that the state had not sufficiently tailored the disclosure 
requirement to its interest in restoring public confidence in the integrity of state 
government.  See id. at 38–41.  The state legislature subsequently amended the bill 
to only prohibit contributions by and require disclosure of dependent children 
over eighteen years of age.  See Conn. Gen. Assembly, Public Act No. 07-1, 2007 Ct. 
ALS 1 (Jan. Sess. 2007). 
 105. Cf. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (explaining that even if “the large 
pooling of financial resources by [the two PACs discussed in the opinion] and 
FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption,” 
Congress’s legislative “response to that evil” was “fatally overbroad” because it 
applied equally to “multimillion dollar war chests” and “informal discussion 
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contribution from the spouse of an individual only tangentially 
involved with procuring a state contract hardly seems justified, even 
from an anti-corruption standpoint.106
Finally, the law applies to all state contractors involved in 
contracts above a threshold amount.107  It is not limited in 
application—as are other states’ laws—to those contracts most 
likely to be awarded through shrewd and surreptitious processes, 
such as those that only regulate state contractors involved in non-
competitively bid contracts.108  Accordingly, Connecticut’s pay-to-
play law does not appear to be closely tailored to the state interest 
of avoiding corruption in government.109
groups that solicit neighborhood contributions”).  Similarly, even if pay-to-play 
poses a true threat to public confidence in government, Connecticut’s law 
attempts to combat that threat by banning many absolutely harmless political 
contributions. 
 106. Cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2499 (2006) (discussing Vermont’s 
lack of justification for imposing restrictive contribution limits). 
 107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-612(g)(1)(C), (g)(2) (Supp. 2007). 
 108. Cf. MSRB Rule G-37, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33868, 56 SEC Docket 
1045 (Apr. 7, 1994) (regarding pay-to-play in the municipal securities business and 
exempting, for the most part, contracts obtained through competitive bidding 
from the definition of “municipal securities business”). 
 109. In fact, a similar argument has already been raised.  The ACLU filed a 
lawsuit in 2006, asserting that the law’s 
absolute ban on political contributions and solicitation of contributions 
by “communicator lobbyists” (and by their families), and by the officers, 
directors and some employees of state contractors and prospective state 
contractors (and by their families) violate[d] those individuals’ freedoms 
of speech and association, protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, by directly curtailing their ability to engage in political 
speech and participate in the political process. 
Plaintiffs’ Compl. ¶ 5, Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D. 
Conn. July 6, 2006) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-333l(h)–(i), -333n(g)–(j) 
(codified as amended CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-610(h)–(i), 9-612(g)–(j) (Supp. 
2007))).  The lawsuit also alleges constitutional infirmities in the state’s new public 
financing program, which was enacted into law as part of the same legislation.  See 
id. ¶¶ 1–4.  But see Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So. 2d 494, 502–04 
(La. 2002) (rejecting arguments that a state law prohibiting any political 
contributions from any officer, director, trustee, partner, senior management level 
employee, or key employee in the casino industry, or the spouse of any of the 
foregoing was unconstitutionally broad); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 
349 N.E.2d 61, 66–67 (Ill. 1976) (rejecting arguments that a state law prohibiting 
any political contributions from any officer, associate, agent, representative, or 
employee of a liquor licensee was unconstitutionally broad). 
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b. New Jersey 
New Jersey’s law is not nearly as broad as Connecticut’s law, 
but it suffers from some of the same infirmities.  In most cases, the 
law applies to a broad group of contributors and recipients.  The 
law bans reportable contributions not only from the state 
contractor and its owners, but also from spouses and children living 
with any individual state contractor or owner.110
The provisions of New Jersey’s law that apply to municipal and 
county contractors ban contributions to any elected municipal or 
county official.111  The provisions that apply to state contractors 
limit only reportable contributions to gubernatorial candidates.112  
But regardless of the division of state or local government involved 
in the contract, reportable contributions to political parties at that 
level of government are completely barred.113
One redeeming quality to New Jersey’s law is that it only 
prohibits “reportable” contributions.  Contributions of up to $300 
are not reportable under state law.114  Therefore, those subject to 
the law still have some ability to participate in the political process 
by making political contributions.  Nonetheless, one can still argue 
that imposing a $300 contribution limit on individuals not closely 
connected to a state contract unnecessarily infringes on the ability 
of individuals to make political contributions, particularly when 
those limits apply to contributions to political parties as well as to 
candidates.115
New Jersey’s general campaign finance law provides that a 
corporation is prohibited from making contributions indirectly 
through its officers or employees by providing them with any type 
of reimbursement or remuneration for the purpose of making 
contributions.116  New Jersey could use a similar approach in its pay-
 110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5, -20.7, -20.17 (Supp. 2007). 
 111. See id. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5. 
 112. See id. § 19:44A-20.15. 
 113. See id. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5, -20.15.  State contractors and their principals 
also are barred from contributing to county political parties.  See id. § 19:44A-
20.15. 
 114. See id. § 19:44A-8(d). 
 115. Generally individuals would be subject to much higher contribution 
limits: $2600 per candidate per election, $25,000 per state political party per year, 
$37,000 per county political party per year, and $7200 per municipal political 
party per year.  See N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, Contribution Limits 
Chart: Entities Receiving Contributions (2007), available at http://www.elec.state.nj.us 
/ForCandidates/elec_limits.html. 
 116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.1 (Supp. 2007). 
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to-play law to eliminate indirect political contributions by people 
unconnected with state contracts, while still allowing individuals 
not closely connected to state contracts to make political 
contributions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Certainly, “[political] [m]oney, like water, will seek its own 
level.  The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled 
flood damage elsewhere.”117  Understandably, states passing broad 
pay-to-play legislation, such as Connecticut and New Jersey, have 
chosen to dam as many avenues for political money as possible.  
These states likely enacted such broad bans on political 
contributions in hopes that they could keep state contractors from 
accomplishing indirectly what they could not do directly. 
Nonetheless, to the extent such state laws eliminate the ability 
of individuals not associated with the state contracting process to 
make any political contributions—and particularly to the extent 
these laws bar individuals from contributing to political parties—
such pay-to-play laws seem unconstitutionally overbroad.  In the 
competitive state contracting market, states certainly have a 
legitimate interest in preventing the exchange of political 
contributions for political favors, as well as increasing public 
confidence in government.  But when creating legislation aimed at 
this purpose, states should consider whether they could accomplish 
this purpose through means less onerous than virtually eliminating 
contribution opportunities by individuals not closely tied to state 
contracts.  They should look past the contributor’s identity to 
determine whether a state contractor is really using its employees, 
owners, or other persons as pass-throughs for contributions to state 
officials.  They should also look past the identity of the recipient to 
determine whether the contribution has actually been earmarked 
for someone else. 
 
 
 117. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999). 
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